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Abstract
This comment argues that a coherent approach to the liberalization of air transport in the EEC
is desirable; however, despite the impetus of Nouvelles Frontie?es, liberalization is unlikely in the
near future. Part I analyzes the Nouvelles Frontie?es decision in the context of the international
regulatory framework in which EEC air transport functions. Part II evaluates EEC proposals that
seek to bring about fairer prices and improved market entry, and concludes that such proposals
would not significantly alter the present system. Part III offers proposals that strike a balance
between free competition and government intervention, in the interest of liberalizing European air
transport. This comment concludes that decisive action by EEC institutions must soon be taken if
the goal of a “common market” is to be realized.

COMMENT
COMPETITION AND DEREGULATION: NOUVELLES
FRONTIERES FOR THE EEC AIR
TRANSPORT INDUSTRY?
INTRODUCTION
These are turbulent times for the European Economic
Community's' (EEC or Community) highly regulated air transport industry. European air travel is currently marked by high
fares 2 and inefficient national airlines, grounding free competition and prospective travelers alike. The anticompetitive nature of the present system is a result of two factors. First, while
the EEC competition rules prohibit restrictive business practices and abuses of dominant market power,3 air and sea transport are the only areas of Europe's economy in which the European Council (Council) has failed to adopt regulations implementing these rules. Second, European air transport is
regulated by bilateral agreements between nations that limit
market entry and allow price fixing, revenue sharing and capacity controls that split air traffic equally between national

carriers.
Despite increasing political and social pressure to deregulate, efforts to open Europe's skies have so far been unsuccess1. The European Economic Community (EEC or Community) was founded in
1957. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-I) (official English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958)
(unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty or Treaty]. The EEC is currently
comprised of 12 Member States: Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain. See Treaty between the Member States of the European Communities and
the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic concerning the accession of the
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, O.J. L 302/9 (1985). See generally P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (4th ed. 1985).
2. Western European air fares are among the highest in the world, while average
American fares are 35 to 40 percent lower than average European fares. Europe'sAir
Cartel, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 1986, at 31. For example, in November 1986,
Europeans paid US$105 for scheduled flights from London to Paris, id. at 26, while
Americans flew from New York to Washington, D.C., on their deregulated airlines
for US$75, id., or coast to coast for US$99. Id. at 24.
3. The competition rules of the EEC are embodied in Articles 85 to 94 of the
EEC Treaty. See generally V. KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION
LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1981).
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ful. However, the recent European Court ofJustice decision in
the Nouvelles Frontires4 case has conclusively held that the competition rules are applicable to air transport and has sparked a
new push for liberalization.
This Comment argues that a coherent approach to the liberalization of air transport in the EEC is desirable; however,
despite the impetus of Nouvelles Frontires, liberalization is unlikely in the near future. Part I analyzes the Nouvelles Frontigres
decision in the context of the international regulatory framework in which EEC air transport functions. Part II evaluates
EEC proposals that seek to bring about fairer prices and improved market entry, and concludes that such proposals would
not significantly alter the present system. Part III offers proposals that strike a balance between free competition and government intervention, in the interest of liberalizing European
air transport. This Comment concludes that decisive action by
EEC institutions must soon be taken if the goal of a "common
market" is to be realized.
I. NOUVELLES FRONTIERES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
EEC AIR TRANSPORT
The European deregulation debate appeared to be coming to a head on April 30, 1986, when the Court of Justice
handed down its long awaited judgment in Nouvelles Frontires.5
The case involved the criminal prosecution of Air France, British Airways, KLM, Air Lanka and several travel agencies, including Nouvelles Fronti~res, France's second largest travel
agent, for selling air tickets at prices below those approved by
the French government. 6 The case was referred to the Court
4. Judgment of April 30, 1986, Minist~re Public v. Asjes, Cases 209-213/84,
1986 E.C.R. -, 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287 [hereinafter Nouvelles Frontiires].
5. Id.
6. Nouvelles Fronti~res, a privately held travel company founded to "democratize French travel," has been sued more than one hundred times for illegal discounting of tickets. Martin, Becoming the Tour De France. Upstart Travel Club Shakes Up Industy, Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 1986, at D8, col. 6. The attorney for Nouvelles Fronti res
cited the "hypocrisy" of laws banning such ticket dumping because the French government encourages its airline to dump tickets in other countries, while prosecuting
airlines and travel agencies that dump tickets in France. Feazel, Liberalization Policies
at Issue in Ruling on French Fare Case, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TEcH.,July 15, 1985, at
29 [hereinafter Feazel, LiberalizationPolicies]. One commentator noted that it is "well
documented that established airlines who try to maintain the present system of
farefixing almost at any price, at the same time sell seats at cut-throat rates to 'ticket-
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of Justice by the Paris Criminal Court-the Tribunal de Police-pursuant to Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, which empowers the Court of Justice to hear matters implicating Community law that arise before national courts. 7
At issue in Nouvelles Frontires was the validity of the French
Civil Aviation Code, which sets forth a compulsory procedure
for the approval of air fares by the French Minister for Civil
Aviation.8 The airlines and travel agencies, who allegedly violated the Code by undercutting approved fares for certain
routes, 9 were brought up on criminal charges by the Minist~re
Public-the French Public Prosecutor's Department."0 The
French Code is best understood in the larger context of a
worldwide system regulating scheduled 1' air services between
scalpers' and 'bucket-shops.' " Kuyper, Case Law, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 661, 663
n.8 (1983) [hereinafter Kuyper, Case Law].
7. Article 177 provides in part:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; .... Where such a question is
raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal
may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it
to give judgment, request the Court ofJustice to give a ruling thereon ....
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177. See generally Dauses, PracticalConsiderations Regarding the PreliminaryRuling Procedure Under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, 10 FORDHAM INT'L
LJ. 538 (1987).
8. The relevant articles of the French Code are annexed to the Nouvelles Fronti res
decision. Article L 330-3 provides that airline companies, and the tariffs they charge,
must be approved by the Minister for Civil Aviation. Article R 330-9 requires that
both French and foreign companies must submit the same data in order to apply for
approval of their air fares. Article 330-15 contains the criminal penalties for infringments of these rules. Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. - (para. 3 of the judgment), 4
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at 16,774, 16,801.
9. The fares were charged for routes from Paris to Bangkok, Sri Lanka, Bombay,
and the United States via London and Amsterdam. Feazel, LiberalizationPolicies, supra
note 6, at 28.
10. Nouvelles Frontiires, 1986 E.C.R. - (opinion of Advocate General Lenz), 4
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at 16,781-82.
11. "Scheduled" flights, namely, "flights which are listed in published timetables, are available to the general public, and operate at the same time of day over the
same general route one or more days each week," make up the greater part of international air service. B. GIDWITZ, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 1

(1980). Charter or nonscheduled carriers operate "irregularly scheduled special
flights, often for established groups, on high-density routes." Id. While the present
regulatory regime assumes the predominance of scheduled air services, "international charter operations have expanded markedly since the mid 1960s outside the
existing regulatory framework." J6nsson, Sphere of Flying. the politics of internationalaviation, 35 INT'L ORG. 273, 290 (1981).
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nations, which in most cases requires carriers to consult each
other on fares before seeking government approval.
A. InternationalLegal Framework of the Air Transport Industry
International civil aviation is governed by the principle of
the sovereignty of a state over its airspace.12 While most states
recognize the right of overflight without landing and the right
to land for noncommercial reasons, such as refueling, other
"freedoms of the air" are not widely accepted.' 3 Thus, states
desiring air service between their territories must exchange
commercial air rights through bilateral or multilateral negotiations. t4 These trade agreements regulate air services between
12. The legal basis of the modern international civil aviation community is the
Chicago Convention of December 7, 1944. Convention on International Civil Aviation, openedfor signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S.
295. The operation of international scheduled air services is controlled by Article 6
of the Convention, which provides: "No scheduled international air service may be
operated over or into the territory of a contracting State, except with the special
permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of
such permission or authorization." Id. art. 6.
One commentator has stated that "[tihe philosophy underlying Article 6 involves viewing international air routes and traffic as a 'potential commodity' subject
to granting, acquisition or exchange." Gertler, Nationality of Airlines: A Hidden Force in
the InternationalAir Regulation Equation, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 51, 55-56 (1982). The
Chicago Convention, however, was unable to resolve many economic issues of international aviation on a multilateral level. See B. GIDWITZ, supra note 11, at 50-51. It
did result in the creation of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
now a specialized agency of the United Nations, which is concerned mainly with technical issues, such as developing international air navigation standards. Id. at 81-83.
For a detailed discussion of the Convention, see W. WAGNER, INTERNATIONAL AIR

79-146 (1970).
13. These technical privileges constitute two of the so-called "five freedoms of
the air" proposed at the Chicago Convention. See B. GIDWITZ, supra note 11, at 49-50.
The third freedom gives an airline the right to set down in another state traffic picked
up in the state in which the airline is registered (outbound traffic). The fourth freedom gives the right to pick up in another state traffic destined for the state of registration (inbound traffic). The fifth freedom gives the right to pick up and discharge
traffic between third countries (extra-national traffic). Id. The fifth freedom is rarely
recognized within the EEC. Dagtoglou, Air Transport and the European Community, 6
EUR. L. REV. 335, 337 (1981). The five freedoms are listed in Contribution of the
European Communities to the development of air transport services-Memorandum
of the Commission, E.C. Bull. Supp. No. 5, Annex 11-1 (1979) [hereinafter 1979
Memorandum].
14. B. GIDWITZ, supra note 11, at 51. The era of bilateralism began with a 1946
agreement concluded in Bermuda by the United States and the United Kingdom, the
two major post-World War II powers in international civil aviation. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom Relating to Air Services Between Their Respective Territories, Feb. 11, 1946,
TRANSPORT AS AFFECTED BY STATE SOVEREIGNTY
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the respective territories of the party states, and in some cases
beyond to third countries, with provisions controlling fares, capacity,' 5 frequency of flights, types of aircraft, designation of
airlines 6 and route structure.
A 1967 international agreement on scheduled air services,1 7 concluded under the aegis of the European Civil Aviation Conference' 8 (ECAC), was signed by all Member States
United States-Great Britain, 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507. Known as the Bermuda
agreement, it became the accepted standard for future bilateral air transport agreements. B. GIDWITZ, supra note 11, at 51. Although the scope of scheduled international air transport has increased dramatically since the signing of the Bermuda
agreement, bilateral agreements remain the primary instruments used by states to
regulate the activities of airlines and presently regulate 27 of the possible 36 links
between EEC Member States. Comm'n, Eighth Report on Competition Policy 38
(1979).
The Bermuda agreement represented a compromise between opposing economic philosophies-the "open skies" approach of the United States and the strict
governmental interventionist position of the United Kingdom. See N. TANEJA, AIRLINES IN TRANSITION 42 (1981). The United States accepted governmental tariff control, which they had been unwilling to do at the Chicago Convention, delegating
determination of international air tariffs to the rate-making machinery of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), subject to the approval of both governments. Id. The United Kingdom accepted the idea that airlines themselves would fix
capacity and frequencies of flights, subject to ex post facto government review. Id.
15. Capacity refers to the number of commercial seats on an aircraft multiplied
by the number of flights over that route within a specific period of time. B. GIDWITZ,
supra note 11, at 139. Many nations have rejected the liberal capacity provisions of
the Bermuda agreement and replaced them with provisions for at least some governmental control of capacity. P.

HAANAPPEL, PRICING AND CAPACITY DETERMINATION IN

35 (1984). One report found governmental limitations on capacity on 90 percent of the routes between member countries of the European Civil Aviation Conference. Garland, The American DeregulationExperience and the
Use of Article 90 to Expedite EEC Air TransportLiberalisation,7 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
193, 202 n.52 (1986). Agreements between Member States generally include "capacity-sharing" arrangements, which ensure that routes to other states are split equally
between national carriers. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, BACKGROUND REINTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT

PORT, COMPETITION IN CIVIL AVIATION

3 (Sept. 18, 1986) [hereinafter

BACKGROUND

And revenue pooling agreements between airlines, involving the pooling
of all revenue earned by different carriers on a single route, are common. Id. at 4.
16. Most states also adhere to the principle of a "chosen instrument," that is,
designation of one airline as official instrument to operate the government franchise
on a particular route. B. GIDWITZ, supra note 11, at 3.
17. International Agreement on the Procedure for the Establishment of Tariffs
for Scheduled Air Services, July 10, 1967, 696 U.N.T.S. 31. This agreement is the
only multilateral agreement ever concluded in international rate-making. P. HAANAPPEL, supra note 15, at 21.
18. The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) is a regional intergovernmental body comprised of 22 European countries, including all Community members. BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 15, at 2. Although it has no regulatory power
per se, its recommendations and resolutions are often implemented as binding reguREPORT].
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except for Germany and Luxembourg. 9 The agreement provides that fares are to be set by airlines through the Traffic
20
Conferences of the International Air Transport Association
(IATA)-the trade association of the world's airlines. Fares set
in this manner are subject to final approval by the governments
of both airlines, a process known as the double approval rule. 2 '
This approval is often perfunctory, since most European airlations on its members since they are agreed to by the directors-general of the national civil aviation administrations. See 1979 Memorandum, supra note 13, at 25.
19. BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 15, at 3. The latter two nations have bilateral agreements which contain similar provisions. Id.
20. IATA is involved in both trade association and tariff coordinating activities
at the multinational level. It represents approximately 180 airlines world-wide, including all EEC Member States except Luxembourg. BACKGROUND REPORT, supra
note 15, at 2. For extensive analysis of IATA, see J. BRANCKER, IATA AND WHAT IT
DOES (1977); R. CHUANG, THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION (1972).
21. Under the "double approval" rule, fares may be inflated because neither
carrier has an incentive to keep prices low. The less efficient airline seeks fares that
will comfortably cover its higher costs. The more efficient carrier is unlikely to oppose high fares that will lead to even greater profits. See Ghandour, Unilateralismversus
Multilateralism: A Dilemma for International Civil Air Transportation Today, in INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT IN THE EIGHTIES 51, 54 (H. Wassenbergh & H. Van Fenema
eds. 1981) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT]. Even if one carrier chooses
to offer cheaper fares or more frequent flights, the government at the other end of
the route may interevene to force alignment of fares and flight frequency with that of
its own airline. BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 15, at 3. Thus, the delegation of
ratemaking power by governments to IATA is to the advantage of "weak" aviation
countries. R. CHUANG, supra note 20, at 122.
Since the purpose of the IATA tariff coordinating procedure is to develop uniform fares, subject to unanimous approval of IATA members, price competition between participating IATA airlines is significantly diminished. See P. HAANAPPEL, supra
note 15, at 81. "For all intents and purposes IATA organises meetings wherein the
air carriers fix prices and provides material assistance to facilitate the process." Salzman, IATA, Airline Rate-Fixingand the EEC Competition Rules, 2 EUR. L. REV. 409, 411
(1977). Fares are determined subjectively and thus end up higher then they would
have been under a more competitive atmosphere. Ghandour, supra, at 54. Rarely is
there an attempt to make the results economically sound; there is no internal mechanism guaranteeing maximum efficiency nor is there a systematic response to consumer demands. Raben, Deregulation: A Critical Interrogation, in INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT, supra, at 20.

IATA's organizational structure was changed in 1978 to make airline participation in ratemaking optional, and perhaps less anticompetitive. See P. HAANAPPEL,
supra note 15, at 61-89. IATA has shifted its focus to traditional trade association
activites in North America and Europe while remaining the primary fare-setting
mechanism for the rest of the world. See Liberal Regulatory Environment Alters IATA's
Fare-Setting Role, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., November 11, 1985, at 102; IATA
Changeof Season Seen at HamburgAGM, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, November 1985, at 18.

However, IATA's fare-setting machinery still provokes criticism and suspicion.
Ghandour, supra, at 56.
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lines are state-owned. 2 Thus government influence on tariff
coordination within IATA is significant, and in many cases decisive.2 3
The French Code at issue in Nouvelles Frontires, similar to
legislation of other Member States, simply establishes procedures that enforce the provisions of the 1967 agreement. 24 It
enables the French authorities to approve air fares that have
been jointly agreed upon by the airlines within the IATA
framework, and then impose them on the airlines by preventing unauthorized fares. The Paris Tribunal, however, reasoned that the compulsory approval procedure encouraged
and, in some cases, required concerted action among the airlines to fix prices, and as such restricted competition in viola25
tion of the antitrust prohibitions of the EEC Treaty.
22. The "flag carriers" of the EEC are more than 50 percent state-owned in all
but two Member States-Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Rek, Euro-deregulation,
Ideals and Reality, 42 INTERAVIA 7 (1987). The Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), of
which Denmark is a participant, operates through state-controlled holding companies. Id.
23. While IATA provides the mechanism for the price-fixing function of the European airline industry, it does so only with the approval, assistance and often the
explicit mandate of governments under the system of bilateral agreements. Salzman,
supra note 21, at 412. Ultimately it is the governments who are responsible for the
setting of fares. Comm'n, Eighth Report on Competition Policy, supra note 14, 38.
24. See Kuyper, Case Law, supra note 6, at 663.
25. Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. - (para. 4 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,774. Article 85 prohibits collusion between undertakings
which "have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market .... " EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(1). The
Treaty prohibits in particular those agreements which "(a) directly or indirectly fix
purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment ....
Id.
Agreements that violate Article 85(1), such as those which fix prices or divide
markets, are automatically void under Article 85(2). Id. art. 85(2). However, an exemption from the prohibition of 85(1) may be granted under 85(3), either individually or by way of a group exemption, where the restriction on competition is outweighed by its beneficial effects. Id. art. 85(3). Article 86 is aimed at abusive exploitation by firms in a dominant position which affects interstate trade. Id. art. 86. There
is no exemption procedure under Article 86.
The prohibitions of Article 85(1) are clearly applicable to the restrictive practices
of the airline industry. See Bentil, Attempt to Regulate Restrictive CommercialPractices in the
Field of Air Transportation Within a TransnationalAntitrust Legal and Institutional Framework, 50J. AIR L. & COM. 69, 82 (1984); Salzman, supra note 21, at 416-21. Article 86
is pertinent in this context to curb abuses of dominant market power. See Bentil,
supra, at 83; Tyrrell, Evolution or Revolution-A Review of Progress on the Abolition of Restrictions on Competition in the Air Transport Sector, 2 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 91, 92
(1981). The Commission may also have recourse to Article 90, which controls the
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In its judgment of March 2, 1984, the Tribunal acquitted
the directors of the travel agencies, discharged the travel agencies themselves, and ruled that the proceedings against the airlines and against their directors should be dealt with separately.2 6 It then suspended its proceedings and requested a
ruling from the Court of Justice regarding the validity of the
compulsory approval procedure under Community law. 2 7
B. Applicability of EEC Competition Rules to Air Transport
After dispensing with several jurisdictional objections,28
the Court refrained the question referred by the French Court.
The Paris Tribunal had initially requested a determination of
the compatibility of the French Code with Community law,
which is an impermissible inquiry under Article 177.29 The
Court restated the issue in terms of whether a Member State
may set up a compulsory approval procedure for air fares, and
criminally punish noncompliance, where such fares are found
to arise out of concerted practice among airlines in violation of
Article 85.3"
restrictive practices of public enterprises and enterprises to which Member States
have granted special or exclusive rights. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
26. Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. at - (opinion of Advocate General Lenz), 4
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,782.
27. Id. (para. 5 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at
16,774.
28. The Court rejected procedural objections made by Air France, KLM and the
French and Italian Governments. Id. (para. 16 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,287, at 16,775; see Chavan, Comments on the Judgment Delivered by the Court of
Justice of the European Communities on April 30th, 1986 Concerning the Application of the
Competition Rules of The Treaty of Rome to Air Transport, Swiss REV. INT'L COMPETITION
L., June 1986, at 59-61. It held that it was up to the referring court, and not the
Court of Justice, to determine whether the reference was necessary. Nouvelles
Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. - (para. 10 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at 16,775. Moreover, neither the possibility of mistakes in the reference itself, id. (para. 12 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,775,
nor the failure of the Tribunal to specify which Treaty provisions were to be applied,
precluded the Court's jurisdiction under Article 177. Id. (para. 14 of the judgment), 4
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,775. In addition, the existence of international civil aviation agreements did not affect the competence of the Court to hear
the case. Id. (para. 13 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at
16,775.
29. Id. (para. 12 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at
16,775.
30. Id. (para. 17 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at
16,775.
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Nouvelles Frontie'res, the United Kingdom and the Commission took the view that the competition rules of the EEC

Treaty are applicable to air transport.3

They relied on an ear-

lier judgment by the Court of Justice in the French Seamens'
Case,3 2 which held that air and sea transport, while excluded
from the common transport policy in the absence of a Council
decision under Article 84(2), nevertheless remain subject to
the "general rules of the Treaty. ' 33 These parties reasoned
that this judgment implies the applicability of the competition
rules to sea and air transport.
The French Government argued that "general rules" refers only to the rules contained in Part Two of the Treaty on
the foundations of the Community, and not to Part Three
("Policy of the Community"), which contains the competition
rules. 4 The Court, however, rejected this argument and held
that the competition rules are to be considered among the general rules of the Treaty and, thus, are applicable to air transport. 5
31. Id. (para. 30 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at
16,777.
32. Commission v. French Republic, Case 167/73, 1974 E.C.R. 359, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8270.
33. Id. para. 32, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8270, at 9187. The Court in the
French Seamans' Case was only called upon to decide the application of the general
rules of Part Two of the Treaty, relating to the free movement of workers, and so it
left the question open as to the meaning of the term "general rules." See Weber, The
Application of European Community Law to Air Transport, 2 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 233,

240 (1977)("Since the term is neither a legal expression used in the Treaty, nor a
part of the current language of the Community institutions, it remains open for interpretation."). In a subsequent case, which is not mentioned explicitly in the Nouvelles
Frontires decision, the Court strongly implied that the general rules of the Treaty
relating to State aids, which are part of the rules on competition as a whole, are
applicable to transport. Commission v. Belgium, Case 156/77, 1978 E.C.R. 1881,
paras. 10-13, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8513, at 7292.
34. Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. - (para. 34 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,777.
35. Id. (para. 42 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at
16,777. The Court reasoned that the first provision in the Transport Title, providing
that the Treaty objectives shall be pursued within the framework of a common transport policy, indicates that the competition rules, as mentioned in Article 3(f) regarding the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is
not distorted, were equally applicable to the transport sector. Id. (para. 36 of the
judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,777. The Court further concluded that the applicability of the competition rules is not conditioned upon the
realization of a common transport policy, id. (para. 37 of the judgment), 4 Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,777, nor does any provision expressly preclude air
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The Court, in light of the absence of a Council regulation
concerning competition in air transport, 36 focused on technical
issues rather than on the substantive issues that concerned the
parties and observers. 7 The applicability of the competition
rules to air transport had already been strongly implied in
transport from the application of the competition rules. Id. (paras. 40-41 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,777. The Court also noted that
under Article 77 of the Transport Title, state aids that "meet the needs of the coordination of transport" are compatible with the Treaty. Id. (para. 39 of the judgment), 4
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,777. This presupposes that the competition
rules, of which the provisions on State aids are a part, are applicable to the transport
sector whether or not a common transport policy has been established. Id. For a
critical analysis of Court's reasoning on this issue, see Kuyper, Case Law, supra note 6,
at 668.
36. See Comm'n, Eleventh Report on Competition Policy 1 (1982). Article 87
obliges the Council, acting on proposals from the Commission and after consulting
Parliament, to adopt regulations giving effect to the competition rules. EEC Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 87. By Council Regulation No. 141, 124 J.O. C 2753 (1962), o.J.
Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, p. 291, the Council exempted the Transport sector from the
scope of Regulation 17, the first Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
EEC Treaty, 13J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, p. 87, 2 Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2401. A regulation adopted in 1968 implements the competition rules
for rail, road and inland water transport, but makes no mention of sea and air transport. Council Regulation No. 1017/68, J.O. L 1750 (1968), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1968(I), p. 302, 2 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2761.
The competition rules are primarily enforced by the Commission. V. KORAH,
supra note 3, at 5. But, without procedures that put into effect the competition rules
for air transport "the law as it now stands does not allow for the consistent application of the rules of competition to sea and air transport ... [making] for uncertainty
in the law, and this is to the disadvantage of shippers, airlines and users." Comm'n,
Fifth Report on Competition Policy 14 (1976).
Sea and air transport are also excluded from the provisions of the Common
Transport policy, EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 74-84, until the Council unanimously decides "whether, to what extent and by what procedure" to include them.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84(2). The lack of progress in developing a Common
Transport policy led the Parliament to bring an action against the Council under
Article 175 for failure to act. Judgment of May 22, 1985, European Parliament v.
Council of the European Communities, Case 13/83, 1985 E.C.R. -, 4 Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,191. However, the Court ofJustice held that the Council's general
obligation to establish a Common Transport policy was not sufficiently defined for a
failure to act to be actionable. Id. at - (para. 53 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,191, at 16,163. It thus appears that the possibility of Parliamentary
action against the Council for failure to pass any legislation in the air transport sector
is foreclosed. For a detailed discussion, see Fennel, The TransportPolicy Case, 10 EUR.
L. REV. 264-76 (1985).

37. See Bellis, "Nouvelles fronti~res" and EEC Competition Law in the Air Transport
Sector: A Restatement of ClassicalJurisdictionalRules, Swiss REV. INr'L COMPETITION L.,

June 1986, at 51. "The Court's opinion resembles a legal steeplechase that ends
somewhere in the middle of the track." Pescatore, Public and PrivateAspects of European
Community Competition Law, 10 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 373, 414 (1987).
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prior case law, and the Commission had been espousing that
view for over two decades. 8 In finding Articles 85 through 90
to be among the general rules of the Treaty, the Court merely
reaffirmed its precedent, resolving any doubts that could hinder Council discussion of liberalization proposals.
C. Enforcement of the Competition Rules
The essence of Nouvelles Frontiresinvolved the question of
what body would act to enforce the competition rules in the air
transport industry in the absence of Council regulations implementing those rules. While confirming the applicability of the
competition rules to air transport, even without any legislation
by the Council, the Court found that the absence of a Council
regulation has repercussions on the direct effect of the rules
within a Member State,3 9 which cripples the ability of EEC institutions to coordinate the liberalization process.
The Court relied on its prior decision in the Bosch 4" case
in holding that agreements concerning air fares remain valid
on a provisional basis until such time as the authorities of the
Member States or the Commission find that they are incompatible with Article 85 or 86. 4" The Court thus rejected both its
38. As early as 1960, the Commission took the view that the competition provisions of the Treaty applied to air transport. See Dagtoglou, supra note 13, at 335.
39. Nouvelles Fronti res, 1986 E.C.R. - (paras. 66-69 of the judgment), 4 Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,780.
40. Bosch v. van Rijn, Case 13/61, 1962 E.C.R. 45, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8003.
41. Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. - (paras. 67-68 of the judgment), 4 Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,780. The Court in Bosch held that procedures set in
Articles 88 and 89 did not ensure the complete and consistent application of Article
85. Bosch, 1962 E.C.R. at 51, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8003, at 7138. Thus, until
the Council acts the competition rules cannot be applied retroactively where it is
unclear who can grant exemptions under Article 85(3). Id. If Bosch is applicable to
air transport, then air tariffs that have already been approved are provisionally valid.
Otherwise, agreements between airlines may be prematurely voided under Article
85(2) before the implementation of procedures under which the Commission might
later grant an exemption pursuant to Article 85(3). Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R.
- (para. 64 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,779. For an
extensive discussion of the issues raised by the Bosch case, see Kuyper, Case Law, supra
note 6, at 672-75.
One commentator has noted that since Article 86 contains neither an automatic
nullity clause nor an exemption clause, Article 86 should be given "full direct effect,"
even in the absence of Commission action under Article 89 or Member State action
under Article 88. Id. at 675. The German Supreme Court has requested a preliminary ruling from the Court ofJustice on this point, among others, in Firma Ahmed
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Advocate General's 42 and the Commission's 43 position. It held
that neither the Court itself nor national courts could determine whether agreements between airlines are covered by the
prohibition of Article 85(1) in a civil or criminal context, given
the lack of Council legislation concerning air transport. 44 Cit-

ing the importance of legal certainty in business agreements,
the Court found the direct effect of Article 85 inapplicable in
national courts until Member States or the Commission have
recorded an infringement under the transitional rules of Articles 88 and 89.
Article 89, while requiring the Commission to apply Articles 85 and 86, provides it with limited powers to deal with an
infringement.46 The Commission may investigate suspected
Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebiiro GmbH v. Zentrale zur BeUmpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V., Case 66/86, O.J. C 105/6-7 (1986).
42. Advocate General Lenz, in his preliminary opinion, advanced an intermediate position. Noting that the Bosch decision had been motivated by the desire to protect legal certainty for existing agreements between private parties, he found that
criminal sanctions imposed for selling air tickets at prices below government-approved levels were unacceptable because the tariffs themselves are based on agreements contrary to the competition rules. Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. - (opinion
of the Advocate General), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,798. He urged
that while it may be appropriate to regard agreements contrary to Community law as
provisionally valid under civil law, the same is not true in a criminal context. Id. In
other words, it is the duty of national courts to defend citizens against such compelled compliance. Id.
43. The Commission argued that the Bosch decision was inapplicable because
the circumstances of that judgment differed significantly from those of air transport.
Id. (para. 66 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,779. The
case involved the applicability of Article 85 before national courts prior to procedural
implementation under Regulation 17. The agreements concerned had been concluded before entry into force of the Treaty and Regulation 17 was adopted while the
case was being heard by the Court. Id., 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at
16,779.
44. Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. - (para. 68 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at 16,780.
45. Id. (paras. 64-65 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at
16,779. Thus, there is no private cause of action for damages before national courts
in the absence of actions by the Commission and the Member States under Articles
89 and 88, respectively. For example, a case brought by Lord Bethell, a member of
the European Parliament, against British Airways for fixing fares on the London to
Amsterdam route was dismissed by the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court,
citing the Nouvelles Frontires decision. UK Court Won't Entertain Case Attacking Collusion
by Airlines, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1284 , at 475 (Oct. 2, 1986).
46. Article 89(1) provides:
Without prejudice to Article 88, the Commission shall, as soon as it takes up
its duties, ensure the application of the principles laid down in Articles 85
and 86. On application by a Member State or on its own initiative, and in
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infringements and propose nonbinding measures to bring
them to an end.4 7 The Commission does not have power to
grant exemptions under Article 85(3). However, it must rely
on Member States for enforcement. If Member States fail in
this duty, the Commission has recourse to the Court of Justice, 4 8 but this may give rise to protracted legal battles. The
Commission's ability to address infringements is further weakened by the vague investigatory powers set out in Article 213,
which rely to a large extent on voluntary disclosures by the accused parties.4 9
While the Commission has limited means to attack a private air cartel under Article 89, it cannot control the anticompetitive practices of airlines under Articles 85 and 86 without
also addressing government involvement.5 0 The Commisison
can take action under Article 90(1), which controls the restrictive practices of public enterprises and enterprises to which
Member States have granted special or exclusive rights. 5' Articooperation with the competent authorities in the Member States, who shall
give it their assistance, the Commission shall investigate cases of suspected
infringment of these principles. If it finds that there has been an infringment, it shall propose appropriate measures to bring it to an end.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 89(1). In 1981, Lord Bethell brought action under
Article 175 and 173 to compel the Commission to move under Article 89 against
airline price-fixing in the EEC. The Court of Justice dismissed the case for lack of
standing. Bethell v. Commission, Case 246/81, 1982 E.C.R. 2277, paras. 16-17,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8858, at 8103.
47. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 89.
48. Under Article 169 the Commission may bring suit against a Member State
for failure to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art.
169.
49. Article 213 provides: "The Commission may, within the limits and under
the conditions laid down by the Council in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty, collect any information and carry out any checks required for the performance of the tasks entrusted to it." EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 213.
The Sterling Airways incident highlighted the difficulties the Commission faces
in applying the competition rules to air transport without investigatory powers similar to those conferred by Regulation 17. In that case a Danish private airline operator challenged the exercise of the monopoly power of the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS). In light of the prevailing legal situation and the limited information at its
disposal, the Commission did not feel it appropriate to dispute the legality of the
grant of exclusive rights to SAS. Comm'n, Tenth Report on Competition Policy
136-38 (1981).
50. See Bentil, supra note 25, at 102; supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
51. Article 90(1) is specifically addressed to the Member States and their
subordinate organs and applies when an Article of the Treaty has been violated. It
provides:
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cle 90 prevents Member States from adopting measures contrary to the competition rules or from sheltering illegal actions
by enterprises because of a special right it has granted.52
In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States
grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor
maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty,
in particular to those rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 90(1). There is a general consensus that Article 90(1)
applies to scheduled airlines in the EEC, whether they are considered public enterprises under de jure or de facto state control or enterprises granted a special or
exclusive right (i.e. a privileged position as "chosen instrument"). See Weber, Air
Transport in the Common Market and the Public Air Transport Enterprises, 5 ANNALS AIR &
L. 283, 286 (1980) [hereinafter Weber, Air Transport in the Common Market].

SPACE

Member States violate Article 90(1) by requiring the setting of uniform fares, which is
contrary to the competition rules in Article 85. See Salzman, supra note 21, at 424.
The airlines may claim, pursuant to Article 90(2), that the competition rules are
inapplicable to their restrictive practices. Enterprises charged with the service of
"general economic interest" are exempted from the scope of Articles 85 and 86 if the
application of these rules would obstruct the achievement of the particular tasks entrusted to them, and if the development of Community trade is not thereby impaired.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 90(2). This exception is strictly construed, BRT v.
SABAM, Case 127/73, 1974 E.C.R. 313, para. 19, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8269,
at 9185-37 (BRT I), and is applicable only if enforcement of the Treaty is "incompatible" with the performance of the tasks. Sacchi v. TeleBiella, Case 155/73, 1974
E.C.R. 409, 431, paras. 14-15, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8267, at 9185-4. It is
doubtful that the application of Articles 85 and 86 is incompatible with the performance of the tasks assigned airlines under bilateral agreements to perform scheduled
international services. See Dagtoglou, supra note 13, at 353; Garland, supra note 15, at
215-16. The exemption applies solely to the tasks themselves, not to individual enterprises. Salzman, supra note 21, at 425.
Most significantly, under Article 90(3), the Commission can issue binding directives or decisions to Member States addressing Treaty violations. EEC Treaty, supra
note 1, art. 90(3). Because EEC airlines are for the most part state-owned or controlled, a decision directed to a Member State with respect to those airlines would
likely have the same effect as if it were directed to the airline itself. Garland, supra
note 15, at 217. The Member State could, of course, refuse to comply, leaving only
recourse to the Court ofJustice, and raising the prospect of a lengthy legal battle. Id.
While Article 90 is potentially a very effective process, at least one commentator
has expressed doubts about the possibility of simply applying the competition rules
in conjunction with Article 90 at different stages of the airline fare-fixing process. See
Kuyper, Airline Fare-Fixingand Competition: An English Lord, Commission Proposals and US
Parallels,20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 203, 214 (1983) [hereinafter Kuyper, Airline Fare-

Fixing]. A debate has recently arisen concerning the compatibility of Member State
intervention in the marketplace with Community law. Compare Pescatore, supra note
37, at 416 (the principle of free competition applies equally to Member States and
private economic operators) with Marenco, Competition Between National Economies and
Competition Between Businesses-A Response to Judge Pescatore, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 420,

433 (1987) ("provided competition is not restricted between national economies, each
Member State is allowed to continue to regulate, or not to regulate, its economy
.")(emphasis in original).
52. The Court in Nouvelles Frontires noted that a Member State violates its duty

822 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:808
Under Article 88, the authorities in the Member States can

rule on the admissibility of agreements and on abuses of a
dominant position, in accordance with their national law and
Articles 85 and 86, when these are submitted to them for approval. 5 3 The authorities also may grant exemptions under Article 85(3). The Article 88 procedure for Member State enforcement of the competition rules, however, could create a
significant amount of legal uncertainty. Member States are
likely to differ in their interpretations of Articles 85 and 86 and
vary in the jurisdictional and enforcement powers granted to
the national "authorities." 5 4 Moreover, there is no procedure
that permits an enterprise to obtain the Commission's formal
assurance that its commercial practice does not violate Article

85(1).

55

Thus, the Court's decision in Nouvelles Frontires is applicable to airlines and their governments only insofar as the Council has not yet adopted a regulation implementing the competition rules. The prohibitions of Articles 85 and 86 are only applicable to agreements which the national authorities, acting
under Article 88, or the Commission, acting under Article 89,
under the Treaty not only if it "requires" concerted action between airlines, but also
if it "favours" the adoption of such practices or "reinforces the effects thereof." 1986
E.C.R. - (para. 72 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,780.
53. Article 88 provides:
Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of Article
87, the authorities in the Member States shall rule on the admissibility of
agreements, decisions and concerted practices and on abuse of a dominant
position in the common market in accordance with the law of their country
and with the provisions of Articles 85, in particular paragraph 3, and of Article 86.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 88. The Court gave a narrow interpretation to the
defintion of "authorities in the Member States" provided in BRT v. SABAM, Case
127/73, 1974 E.C.R. 51, para. 19, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8268, at 9185-23 (BRT
I). The Court in Nouvelles Frontiresheld that the term refers to either the administrative authorities entrusted with the task of applying domestic legislation on competition (subject to judicial review in the national courts), or the courts to which the
application of competition law is specifically entrusted. 1986 E.C.R. - (para. 55 of
the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,778. Thus, the Paris Criminal Court, which itself does not fall within this definition of"authorities in the Member States," was denied the competence to rule on the question it had referred to the
Court ofJustice because the Commission and French authorities have not acted. Id.
(para. 56 of the judgment), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at 16,778. See
Kuyper, Case Law, supra note 6, at 670-72.
54. Salzman, supra note 21, at 414-15.
55. Id.; Bentil, supra note 25, at 84-85; cf. Regulation 17, supra note 36, art. 2
(negative clearance procedure).
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have found to violate the competition rules. In the case before
the French Tribunal, no such decision by the French authorities or the Commission had been made. 6
D. Nouvelles Frontibres: Benchmark or "Nondecision"?
The decision in Nouvelles Frontiresmanaged to please both
supporters and opponents of deregulation alike.5 7 Many observers believed that once the Court of Justice confirmed the
applicability of the competition rules to air transport, competition would finally land in Europe. Media reaction following
the case decision heralded the end of Europe's air cartel and
the inauguration of an era of "open
skies."5 " Others, however,
5
claimed "nothing had changed.

Those who opposed liberalization or advocated a gradual
approach were satisfied because enforcement was left largely
in the hands of the Member States, in cooperation with the
Commission.6" The Member States are likely to move slowly,
if at all, to enforce competition rules, and can make it difficult
for the Commission to exercise its powers under Article 89.61
Governments have little incentive to sanction their own national airlines, and in any event have the power under Article
88 to exempt certain restrictive arrangements under Article
85(3).62 Member States and their airlines remain insulated
from the direct effect of Article 85 as long as Commission proposals remain tabled.
While there is still no firm mechanism to enforce the competition rules, Nouvelles Frontieres has proven valuable for its
timing in the political arena if not for its substance. The decision clarified the legal status of European air transport and
56. Nouvelles Frontires, 1986 E.C.R. - (paras. 57, 59 of the judgment), 4 Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at 16,778.
57. See Bellis, supra note 37, at 51.
58. See Krause, Air Travel: DeregulationLands in Europe, Int'l Herald Tribune, May
15, 1986, at 5, col. 1. London sources described the ruling as "outlawing air fare
price fixing" and "the lift off for competition." EEC Air Transport Industry is Governed
by Treaty of Rome, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1267, at 953 (May 29,
1986) [hereinafter EEC Air Transport].
59. Id. (comment of senior official with IATA following Nouvelles Frontires decision).
60. Bellis, supra note 37, at 51.
61. See Kuyper, Case Law, supra note 6, at 681 n.37.
62. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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provided a boost for liberalization. The Council's obligation
to act on Commission proposals was reinforced, as was the
mandate to national governments and the Commission to apply the competition rules. The case gave the Commission a
stick with which to prod recalcitrant national airlines and their
Member States, and the legal endorsement to attack opponents of deregulation.
On the other hand, Nouvelles Frontieres has had less impact
than initially hoped, as evidenced by the failure of the Council
of Transport Ministers to pass even a watered-down version of
the Commission's proposals in December 1986.63 This further
underscores the need for a rapid decision on the establishment
of a Community policy for air transport. Nouvelles Frontie'res
may have marked the beginning of a transitional period during
which Member States and the Commission take ad hoc actions
under Articles 88 and 89 to quicken the liberalization process,
but eventually a common policy must be adopted. The lack of
progress in deregulating the air transport sector is a clear setback to EEC competition policy and the Community's goal of a
free "internal market" by 1992.64
II. AFTER NOUVELLES FRONTIERES: COMPETITION
STILL UP IN THE AIR
In the wake of Nouvelles Frontires, it is clear that the Commission may bring actions against Member States and their airlines under Articles 89 and 90 while waiting for the Council to
act on Commission proposals that liberalize air transport in the
EEC.
A. Commission Attempts at Bringing EEC Airlines Down to Earth
As an immediate consequence of Nouvelles Frontibres, the
Commission inJuly, 1986, carried out its oft-repeated threat to
bring action against airlines under Article 89.65 It sent warn63. At a December 15, 1986 meeting the Transport Ministers again failed to
reach agreement on liberalization proposals. EC Failsto Free Civil Aviation; Airlines Will
Face Antitrust Charges, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1298, at 94 (January
15, 1987) [hereinafter EC Fails to Free Civil Aviation].
64. COM(85) 310 final, Completing the InternalMarket: White Paperfrom the Commission to the European Council, 1 (June 14, 1985).
65. Comm'n Press Release, IP (86) 353 (July 10, 1986), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,798. The airlines concerned are Sabena (Belgium), SAS (Denmark), Luf-
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ing letters to ten national EEC airlines demanding the end of
certain restrictive practices such as price-fixing and capacity
sharing. 66 The letters asked the airlines to indicate what measures they would take to eliminate the restrictions on competition. 6 7 If the violations were not brought to an end, the Commission would be obliged to issue a reasoned decision declaring the bilateral agreements null and void and to authorize
measures needed to remedy the situation. 68 Failure to comply
would leave the airlines open to actions before the Court of
Justice under Article 169 and to enforcement actions in national courts by private parties injured by their agreements. 69
The Commission had initially planned to drop the proceedings if the Transport Ministers agreed on an acceptable air
transport policy in 1986.70 Since airline practices are governed
by bilateral agreements between governments, it was feared
that state-owned airlines would argue that the legal problem
should be addressed by the transportation authorities of the
governments concerned. 71 However, all ten airlines have since
agreed to negotiate with the Commission on central issues and
the Article 89 proceedings have been suspended. 72 By pressing the issue, the Commission has forced the airlines to consider voluntary change, though it is unclear how far negotiathansa (Germany), Olympic Airways (Greece), Air France (France), Aer Lingus (Ireland), Alitalia (Italy), KLM (Netherlands), British Airways (U.K.) and British Caledonian (U.K.).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
70. See Feazel, Europeans Deadlock on Easing Discount Fare Restrictions, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 17, 1986, at 30 [hereinafter Feazel, Europeans Deadlock].
71. EEC Commission Advises Airlines to Revise Fare, Capacity Agreements, 51 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1274, at 116 (July 17, 1986) [hereinafter EEC Commission Advises Airlines].
72. Airlines Avoid EC Action By Agreeing to Negotiate, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1987, at
19, col. 4 [hereinafter Airlines Avoid EC Action]. As of March, 1987, Lufthansa,
Olympic Airways and Alitalia had refused to negotiate, and the Commission had extended the deadline. See The Beginning of the End for Europe's Airline Duopolies, THE
ECONOMIST, March 21, 1987, at 71 [hereinafter The Beginning of the End]. The Chairman of Alitalia had previously stated, "We are not answerable to [the Commission].
We will comply only with directives from our own government." Alitalia Rejects EEC
Request For Data on Operational Practices, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 17,

1986, at 39. The federal cartel office in West Germany has begun its own investigation into Lufthansa. The Beginning of the End, supra.

826 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:808
tions will go toward eliminating restrictive practices.7 3
B. Pending Commission Proposals: Permanently Grounded?
Although Community antitrust policy in the air transport
sector remains undefined, it has not been for lack of proposals
by the Commission. In 1984, the Commission proposed a
package of measures concerning capacity, tariffs and competition in its Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2, Progress towards
the development of a Community air transport policy 7 4 (Memorandum No. 2), which it amended following Nouvelles
Fronti'eres.7 5 The provisions of Memorandum No. 2, if adopted
by the Council, might increase fare flexibility, but would
achieve little with regard to capacity and market access.
The Commission's proposal on air fares, 76 which would affect only intra-Community flights,7 7 would permit airlines to
set their tariffs freely within "zones of flexibility" without consulting other airlines or seeking government approval. 78 Tariff
consultation between airlines would still be permitted, however, provided that airlines retain the effective right to act independently, subject to limited government control, and that
Member States and the Commission may act as observers.7 9
Although "zones of flexibility," which establish a range of
permissible fares, still constitute price-fixing, they could pro73. Airlines Avoid ECAction, supra note 72, at 19, col. 4. The Commission has left
open the possibility of renewing legal action against the airlines if negotiations are
unsatisfactory. Id.
74. Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2, Progress towards the development of a Community
air transportpolicy, COM(84) 72 final, O.J. C 182/1-3 (1984) [hereinafter Memorandum No. 2]. Memorandum No. 2 and the proposals annexed to it expand on the
objectives of the 1979 Memorandum, supra note 13.
75. Following Nouvelles Frontires, the Commission sent the Council a communication on civil aviation in which it set out a general policy framework. COM(86) 338
final/2. It followed this with an internal document slightly revising several proposals
of Memorandum No. 2 in hopes of expediting agreement. COM(86) 328 final.
76. Memorandum No. 2, supra note 74, Annex II. This modifies a proposed Directive submitted for approval in 1981, COM(81) 590 final.
77. Memorandum No. 2, supra note 74, Annex II, art. 1.
78. Id., arts. 5-6. Airlines need not consult other airlines or governments provided that the tariffs filed are reasonably related to costs and generate sufficient revenue to cover direct operating costs. Id. A binding arbitration procedure would govern disputes concerning fares falling outside established zones. Thus no government
could indefinitely block the introduction of a fare proposed by an airline. COM(86)
338 final/2, Annex II.
79. Memorandum No. 2, supra note 74, Annex IIIC.
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vide effective protection against predatory pricing 80 and introduce a degree of flexibility into the present system.8 1 The latest proposals before the Council, however, would limit such
zones to discount and deep discount fares, leaving the basic
structure of "normal" fares untouched.8 2 These discounted
fare zones are marked more by their restrictiveness than by
their flexibility. Member States are quarreling over the conditions to be attached to the discount fares,8" which in many
cases already exist at the proposed levels or lower. 8 4 This tink80. See Remarks of Alfred E. Kahn, former Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, quoted in Dell, Interdependence and the Judges: Civil Aviation and Antitrust, 61 INT'L
AFF. 355, 361 (1985). Mr. Kahn, a primary architect of U.S. deregulation, describes
predatory pricing in the following way: "If predation means anything, it means deep,
pinpointed, discriminatory price cuts by big companies aimed at driving price cutters
out of the market, in order then to be able to raise prices back to their previous
levels." Id. "Zones of flexibility" by definition permit variations in pricing only
within strictly defined boundaries. Governments can.intervene where there are serious departures from the standard or norm. See Garland, supra note 15, at 231.
81. See Stanbrook, Progress Towards a Community Policy on Air Transport, 10 EUR. L.
REV. 52, 56 (1985).
82. EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE DocuMENTS (No. 4428) 5 (Nov. 12-13, 1986). The British President of the Council of Ministers proposed two zones, going from 90 percent to 65 percent of the price of an
economy ticket for a discount fare and from 65 percent to 45 percent for deep-discount fares. The Member States deadlocked over the conditions attached to the discount fares. Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy and Portugal objected to easing
the restrictions. Id.
Britain's recent backtracking from its "liberal" position in anticipation of the
denationalization of British Airways further complicated the situation. "[W]orried
that even semi-open skies will reduce the stockmarket value of its planned pre-election privatisation of British Airways", the British President of the Council dropped
his government's former insistence on the need for urgent reform and accepted the
timid ECAC plan. Skyway Robbery, THE EcONOMIST, Nov. 1, 1986, at 16. Deregulation proponents denounced the "enormity of the British capitulation." EUROPE,
AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE DOCUMENTS (No. 4423) 8
(Nov. 5, 1986). The Belgian government, which inherited the semi-annual presidency of the Council of Ministers from Britain in January 1987, was left with the
burden of pushing deregulation measures through the Council.
Consumer groups applauded the proposals' demise, calling the plan a "sham"
and claiming "[iut is much better to have no decision at all than for [the Council] to
approve the package they were considering." Feazel, Europeans Deadlock, supra note
70, at 31.
83. Following the November meeting, a Dutch transport ministry official said,
"The fares issue may be completely hopeless. The prospects are really black. We are
very worried about the future of liberalization." Feazel, EuropeansDeadlock, supra note
70, at 30.
84. EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE Docu-

MENTS (No. 4344) 14 (June 21, 1986).
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ering with discount fares is no substitute for a comprehensive
dismantling or reworking of the price-fixing system.
Memorandum No. 2 would eliminate bilateral provisions
that provide for an equal division of traffic services between
two Member States."5 The proposal, however, contains a
safety net permitting government regulation of capacity when
the share of its national airline falls below 25 percent of the
total traffic on that route.8 6 Such capacity sharing agreements
would be permissible provided that they are not obligatory,
that they help ensure a spread of services during less busy periods, and that any party may withdraw on three months notice." There appears to be a consensus, however, to move to a
less liberal 60/40 capacity share on a given route within a
three-year period. 8
Capacity controls, while relaxed under present proposals,
still constitute market-rigging. Although the Commission proposal seeks to free the airlines from controls exercised by
Member States, it enables the Member States jointly to plan
the capacity to be provided and assumes some governmental
predetermination of capacity. Moreover, increased fare flexibility without capacity flexibility could prove meaningless.
There would be no incentive to lower fares if an airline could
not significantly increase capacity in order to carry the additional traffic generated by lower fares.8 9
The proposed regulation included in Memorandum No. 2
implementing the competition rules in the air transport sec85. Memorandum No. 2, supra note 74, Annex I, arts. 1, 4, OJ. C/1-2.
86. Id. Annex I, art. 1.
87. COM(86) 328 final, Annex I. One commentator has noted that the three
month notice provision, "held out as a significant concession, is in all probability no
more than what airlines already have in their agreements." Stanbrook, supra note 81,
at 56. The Commission, in addition to granting group exemptions for capacity sharing and tariff consultations, is prepared to grant a group exemption to pools which
limit the transfer of revenue between airlines to one percent of the revenue earned
on a particular route by the transferring partner. COM(86) 328 final, Annex I. To
allow airlines time to adjust to more open competition, the Commission would grant
these three group exemptions from the competition rules for a trial period of three
years and subject to compliance with certain conditions. Id.
88. EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE DocuMENTS (No. 4428) 5 (Nov. 12-13, 1986); see infra note 113 and accompanying text.
89. See Feazel, European Nations Near Agreement Allowing Airlines Greater Freedom,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 17, 1986, at 38.
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tor9 ° is necessary to provide a comprehensive administrative

machinery assuring uniform application to Member States. It
would give the Commission the necessary powers to investigate, make decisions and impose penalties; 9 ' it also determines
the procedures for granting exemptions from the ban on cartels under Article 85(3) or cease-and-desist decisions under
Articles 85(1) or 86.92
However, the direct applicablity of the competition rules
will not easily secure deregulation. The proposed regulation,
aside from providing an exemption for certain technical cooperation agreements, 93 is concerned only with procedure and

applicable only to air transport between Community airports.94
The scope of the proposed regulation is limited, given that Articles 85 and 86 are directly applicable only to enterprises (i.e.
airlines) and not to Member States.95 The Commission has
recognized that, to the extent airline tariff practices merely
carry out government instructions, the planned regulation will
not change the present situation.96 To effect this change the
conduct of Member States will have to be challenged under
Article 90.9 7 Yet, the regulation would at least ensure that the
90. In 1981 the Commission submitted to the Council a proposal for a regulation applying the competition rules to air transport. COM(81) 396 final, OJ. C
291/4 (1981). In 1982 a slightly revised version was presented to the Council. O.J. C
317/3 (1982). This was amended by Memorandum No. 2., supra note 72, Annex III,
OJ. C 182/2. These amendments were later withdrawn and resubmitted. COM(86)
328 final.
91. O.J. C 317/3, arts. 13-15.
92. O.J. C 317/3. These procedural rules are modeled on both Regulation 17
and Regulation 10 17/68, which governs transport by rail, road and inland waterway.
See supra note 36. Consistent with Regulation 1017, the approach adopted for obtaining individual exemptions under Article 85(3) is less stringent than in Regulation
17. Agreements, decisions, and concerted practices do not have to be notified in
advance. It is for the Commission alone, OJ. C 317/3, art. 7, acting either in response to a complaint or on its own initiative, to determine whether prohibition or
exemption is justified in each case. Id. art. 4(3). In practice, however, companies
desiring exemption of a restrictive practice must still make a formal application to the
Commission. Unless the Commission opposes the practice within 90 days of publication of a summary of the application in the Official Journal, the restrictve practice is
deemed exempt for the time already elapsed, and for the ensuing three years. Id. art.
5(3).
93. COM(86) 328 final, art. 2, at 3-4.
94. Id. art. 1(2), at 3.
95. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(1).
96. Comm'n, Tenth Report on Competition Policy 13 (1980).
97. Id.
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Commission could avoid the vagaries of the Article 89 procedure and the self-serving exemptions granted by Member
States under Article 88.98
Memorandum No. 2 did not include provisions regarding
market access-the right of an airline to operate services. But
the Commission did propose amendments to a 1983 Directive
on scheduled inter-regional air services between Member
States.9 9 That Directive has had a negligible effect in increasing market entry' 0 0 because it permitted regional carriers to
establish new services only between small regional airports involving routes of at least 400 kilometers and aircraft carrying
no more than 70 passengers.' 0 ' Amendments would liberalize
access from a central airport to a regional destination, eliminate the requirement that new routes be at least 400 kilometeres long, allow carriers to operate flights that take off and
land outside their home country-which is known as "fifth
freedom" rights-and permit entry of more airlines on re0 2
gional routes, subject to certain conditions.'
Access to major airports is a sensitive issue and Member
States are unlikely to reach a consensus in the near future on
this point. 0 What is missing from the Commission amendments is a proposal to open all existing routes to new carriers,
which would provide the very element of competition that the
bilateral system by definition excludes. This type of free market access has been one of the cornerstones of U.S. deregula0 4
tion.
The Commission's proposals are ambivalent, permitting
greater flexibility within the existing system, on one hand, and
98. See Kuyper, Airline Fare-Fixing,supra note 51, at 229.

99. Council Directive No. 83/416, O.J. L 237/19 (1983).
100. Only 14 new routes have been opened since its passage. Feazel, EEC Offcials Draft New Directive to Ease Regional Airline Regulation, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Apr. 14, 1986, at 37. The Directive had initially aimed to increase flexibility in
market access in the area of regional transport. But, as adopted by the Council, it

was substantially reduced in scope compared to the original Commission proposal.
See Feazel, EEC Examines Liberalization of Inter-regional Air Services, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 11, 1985, at 32.
101. Council Directive 83/416, supra note 99.
102. COM(86) 424 final, O.J. C 240 (1986).
103. See Editorial Comments: Liberalising Air Transport, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
517, 519 (1986).
104. Martin, An End to Europe's Airline Cartel?, Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 1986, at D8,
col. 1.
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modifying that system by applying the competition rules, on
the other. But given the political conflicts between EEC institutions, the division between Member States, °5 and the division within the Commission itself over the pace of reform, 0 6
Memorandum No. 2 is unlikely to be passed.
C. ECAC Compromise Indicates Retreat

In January 1987, while the Commission's proposals remained blocked, the ECAC implemented "memorandums of
understanding" partially liberalizing fare and capacity regulations among the ECAC's member countries.10 7 These memoranda mirror compromise positions put before the Council in
late 1986.108 Although the Commission opposed the memoranda, and Great Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands refused
to sign the agreement because they believed the reforms were
notextensive enough, 09 the memoranda are now in effect for
all other member nations and replace the 1967 agreement and
existing bilateral agreements on fares and capacity.'
The memoranda set up zones of reasonableness for discount and deep discount fares, subject to several conditions.I"
105. The Member States have been described as falling into four groups: the
"great liberalisors"(Netherlands, Great Britian and Ireland); those who would accept
a measure of liberalization, but later rather than sooner (Germany, France and Luxembourg); those who wish to maintain fairly tough regulations but seem willing to
move toward some liberalization (Belgium, Italy and Portugal); and the "champions
of the restrictive regime" (Denmark, Spain and Greece). EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE DOCUMENTS (No. 4427) 8 (Nov. 10-11,
1986).
106. Mr. Peter Sutherland, the Irish Commissioner responsible for competition,
advocates an accelerated approach to deregulation, while Mr. Stanley Clinton Davis,
the British Commissioner responsible for transport, supports a more cautious program. See Peel, Commission Divided Over Airline Regulations, Int'l Herald Tribune, June
12, 1986, at 2.
107. See ECAC Approves Liberalizing Fare, Capacity Regulations, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Jan. 12, 1987, at 36 [hereinafter ECAC Approves].
108. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
109. ECAC Approves, supra note 107. The Dutch, British and Irish delegations to
the ECAC found the proposals "hopelessly restrictive." Civil Aviation Conference
Presents No Solutions for Airline Deregulation, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1302, at 280 (Feb. 12, 1987) [hereinafter No Solutions for Airline Deregulation].
110. ECAC Approves, supra note 103.
111. Id. The ECAC agreement establishes two fare zones, a discount zone for
fares ranging from 65-90 percent of the economy fare, and a deep discount zone
ranging from 45-65 percent of the full economy fare. To qualify for approval within
the discount zone, trips must be round trip, with a minimum stay of six days or over a

832 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:808
The Council discussions in late 1986 had broken down over
proposals to ease these discount fare restrictions. 1 2 Under
these proposals, a Member State may intervene to regulate ca-

pacity if the market share of its national carrier falls below 45
percent on a given route.' 1 3 The memoranda do not give air-

lines the right of free access to routes, liberalize interregional
service, or change the present system for determining first
class, business or full economy fares.
This cautious three-year experiment is moderate enough
to satisfy the Commission's more reactionary members but
does little to further overall liberalization. Proponents of competition fear that the memoranda are an attempt to forestall a
decision by the Council on the Commission's proposals, and
that the impetus to achieve liberalization has spent itself on
garnering concessions that fail to effect system-wide reform. 1 4
Moreover, the memoranda are already outdated by more lib1 15
eral bilateral agreements.
Sunday, and a maximum stay of six months. Deep discount zone conditions include
these conditions plus an additional one, such as going standby. See EEC Deregulation
Proposal Blocked While ECAC Plan Proceeds, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 7,
1986, at 33-35 [hereinafter EEC Deregulation]. It has been estimated that more than
half of European passengers are business travelers who could not meet the conditions for the discount fares. Id. at 35.
112. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
113. EEC Deregulation,supra note 11, at 33. One commentator noted that the
ECAC scheme presents no multilateral aspect other than the "multilateral agreement
to tighten (instead of liberalize) the capacity clause of bilateral air agreements ....
[T]he scheme amounts to over-regulation of both government- and airline-activity instead of effecting de-regulation." Wassenbergh, The "Nouvelles Frontidres" Case, 11 AIR
L. 161, 165 (1986) (emphasis in original).
114. See Donne, Airlines given more freedom, Fin. Times, June 28, 1986, at 1. The
Secretary of State for Transport in the United Kingdom said the effect of the arrangements is "to shore up the existing system, rather than to make real steps in the direction of a more liberal regime." No Solutions for Airline Deregulation,supra note 109, at
280.
115. For example, the British and Dutch Governments negotiated a new bilateral agreement in 1984 liberalizing air services between their two nations. Fares
need be approved only by the country where the flight starts (country of origin rule),
airlines themselves may determine frequency and capacity levels, and any airline certified by the two nations may fly any route between the countries. See Brown, Britain
Urges Deregulation Effort in 1986, AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 2, 1985, at 36.
Traffic between the two countries grew by 24 percent during the first eight months
under the agreement, seating capacity on the Amsterdam-London route grew by 77
percent between 1983 and 1986, and the number of airlines making nonstop flights
between the two countries rose from seven to ten. Woolley, Airline Liberalisation:Europe in Transition, 41 INTERAVIA 859, 860 (1986). A liberalization of air routes be-
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III. FLIGHT PATH FOR THE FUTURE
Government regulation of international air transport in a
free or mixed economy has been justified in part by the oligopolistic nature of the airline industry and by its status as a
quasi-public utility." 6 Because the industry is capital intensive, market entry is not easy." t7 With a limited number of
large suppliers, governments rely on IATA's tariff coordinating function to avoid tariff wars.'"I Through the framework of
IATA, a sophisticated, reliable, and highly regulated, international air transport system has been created." 9 This system
has made possible, for example, the "interlining" process by
which air tickets paid in the currency of one state are accepted
by most of the world's airlines.' 2 ° Moreover, this regulated
system can also mean regular service to small regional airports,
consistent service standards and convenient flight sched12 1
ules.
For all its convenience, however, the present system has
spawned indiscriminate protectionism. Dependence on state
intervention in the form of bilateral agreements has resulted in
the introduction of partisan, non-economic elements into the
system, such as national defense, prestige and foreign policy
concerns. 12 2 National carriers may be required to earn specified amounts of convertible currency, maintain a level of employment in excess of real need, support a domestic aircraft
manufacturing industry, or operate commercially unsound
routes consistent with a particular foreign policy. 123 Moreover,
a national airline is a "flag carrier" that expresses national
tween Ireland and Great Britain has resulted in fares falling from £94 to £69 and a
thirty percent increase in passengers. The Beginning of the End, supra note 72, at 72.
116. See P. HAANAPPEL, supra note 15, at 47.
117. Id.
118. Id. Deregulation critics point to several factors, including a market that can
reasonably support only a limited number of competitors, highly variable demand
and difficulties in forecasting demand-some even arguing that there are low barriers
to market entry-as tending to lead to over-capacity and, thus, predatory pricing.
Garland, supra note 15, at 231.
119. Dagtoglou, supra note 13, at 337.
120. Id.
121. See Carey, Common Market Prods Europe'sAirlines to CeaseAnti-Competitive Agreements, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1986, at 19, col. 2.
122. See P. HAANAPPEL, supra note 15, at 49.
123. See B. GIDWITZ, supra note 11, at 19-26. For example, both British Airways
and Air France receive substantial governmental subsidies to operate the commer-
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pride and is thought to deserve national protection. 1 24 Thus,
political aims have a significant impact on international air
transport.
Because the EEC is a relatively small geographic area with
a large number of sovereign states, the deficiencies of the present system are glaringly apparent. As Member States often
combine tariff control, capacity control and pooling arrange25
ments, there is almost no competition between airlines.
Government control over market entry and the absence of
price competition under IATA accomodates inefficiency, results in high fares and inadequate profits, and deprives con26
sumers of a free choice of airlines and services.'
The protectionist character of the present system fosters
conservative rather than innovative policies 27 and may adversely affect the level of service offered travelers. It is unlikely
that significant changes could be achieved at the national
level.' 12 The European consumer would likely benefit from
29
the introduction of greater competition into this system.
More reasonable fares would no longer keep the less affluent
consumers on the ground. Air travel would be opened to a
cially nonviable Concorde, a product of British and French state aircraft industries.
B. GIDWITZ, supra note 11, at 21.

124. Dagtoglou, supra note 13, at 343.
125. P. HAANAPPEL, supra note 15, at 37.
126. Colegate, Pricing in InternationalAir Transport-A British View, in

INTERNA-

TIONAL AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 21, at 142.

127. Raben, supra note 21, at 18.
128. Id. at 21.
129. At present less than 10 percent of European citizens use air transport services.

EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE DOCUMENTS

(No. 4453) 16 (Dec. 17, 1986). In North America, where 91 percent of the miles
flown by passengers were on discount fares-almost double the percentage for Europe-the growth in the number of passengers from 1981 to 1985 was 36.2 percent,
compared with 10.3 percent in Europe. The Beginning of the End, supra note 72, at 71.
Given Commission estimates that forty percent of EEC airline costs are "manageable," Memorandum No. 2, 42, one commentator noted that if competition forced a
saving of only 10 percent of those costs, European consumers would save over halfa
billion U.S. dollars annually. See Stelzer, Air Transport Deregulation: The U.S. Experience
and its Applicability to Europe (speech delivered at symposium sponsored by the Institute of Air Transport, Paris, France, May 21, 1984), in 1984 Vital Speeches of the Day
694, 698. An analysis of air fares within the EEC published in 1986 reports substantially lower air fares where competition exists with charter airlines, where more than
one national airline has access to a route, or where competiton related to Great Britain's bilateral agreements has arisen. See Garland, supra note 15, at 206 n.77.
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wider market and would offer a greater variety of airlines and
prices.
The international legal underpinnings of the air transport
industry do not preclude the introduction of effective economic competition into air transport. The implementation of
"zones of reasonableness" for air fares on the North Atlantic
route between the United States and ECAC member countries 30 illustrates the viability, under certain conditions, of a
free competition system not only in a domestic environment
but also in an international context.
While European policymakers have been unable to agree
on the method for liberalization of air transport, the large majority reject the applicability of American-style deregulation to
Europe. 13 ' A "go-slow" attitude and an unwillingness to disrupt the existing3 2bilateral system best characterizes the European approach.

Although relevant, comparisons with the U.S. experience
are not wholly valid. The United States is a large single market, while the EEC is a series of fragmented markets made up
of 12 sovereign nations. Labor costs, air navigation charges,
landing fees and fuel costs are higher in Europe than in the
United States. 33 Member States argue that the existing ar130. The U.S.-ECAC Memorandum of Understanding went into effect in 1982,
establishing "zones of reasonableness" for fares on scheduled North Atlantic flights
within which governments may not interfere. P. HAANAPPEL, supra note 15, at 164.
Unlike the ECAC memorandums of understanding recently implemented within Europe, supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text, this understanding does not exclude zones for first class, business and full economy fares. P. HAANAPPEL, supra note
15, at 164. The ECAC and the United States have recently approved a new two-year
memorandum of understanding on North Atlantic fares allowing a 10 percent drop
in the deep discount "zone of reasonableness." ECAC, U.S. Renew North Atlantic Pact,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 23, 1987, at 32.
131. Condom, Liberalismand Public Service, 41 INTERAVIA 725, 725 (July 1986); see
also Comment of Stanley Clinton Davis, Commissioner for Transport of the European Commission (Memorandum No. 2 "says 'No' to U.S.-style deregulation. We
refuse to bring about this sort of market free-for-all."), quoted in Comm'n Press Release, IP (85) 385 (Sept. 11, .1985), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,726, at 11,700.
132. See, e.g., Garland, supra note 15, at 204. The package of proposals included
in Memorandum No. 2 expressly "maintain[s] the structure of the present regulatory
system based on bilateral intergovernmental agreements." Memorandum No. 2,
supra note 74, at I (summary).
133. P. HAANAPPEL, supra note 15, at 177. Yet airline costs within Europe are
only 20 percent higher than in the United States, while ticket prices for comparable
services are on average 35 to 40 percent higher. Europe's Air Cartel, supra note 2, at
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rangement ensures service to less populated regions13 4 and
preserves jobs where job creation has been a problem. In addition, most European governments consider their state airline, no matter how inefficient and unprofitable, to be essential
to national prestige, while the United States has a relaxed view
about the fate of any one of its carriers. t 35 In Europe, much
more so than in the United States, there also exists attractive
alternatives to scheduled air travel. An extensive and relatively
low-cost charter service,' 36 a highly developed and heavily subsidized rail system and excellent international highways satisfy
37
the needs of many intra-European travelers.'
European air transport, however, is not so unique that it
needs to be shielded from itself or from the effects of greater
competition. Productivity gaps between U.S. and European
airlines reveal that the present system has sheltered waste and
inefficiency.' 38 The Commission has noted that experience
outside Europe evidences the positive economic consequences
of deregulation. These include increased passenger traffic,
stimulus to civil aircraft industry, and growth of ancillary services such as hotels, restaurants and tourism.' 39 U.S. deregula24. Thus, there remains a 15 to 20 percent margin for decrease through increased
competition. See id.
134. Salzman, supra note 21, at 419.
135. Comm'n Press Release, supra note 131.
136. The European charter airline industry has "traditionally played much the
same role in Europe as the no-frills carriers ... have done in the American domestic
market." Europe's Air Cartel,supra note 2, at 26. Charter services supply sixty percent
of all travel within Europe. Id. However, one commentator argues that a charter
flight "cannot reasonably be compared to a scheduled flight; for it is attached to so
many conditions that, in practice, it can only appeal to the tourist who plans his journey well in advance, while it offers no genuine alternative to the scheduled flight for
the 'normal' passenger." Dagtoglou, supra note 13, at 340 n.24.
137. See Rek, supra note 22, at 7. "In Europe, even deregulated scheduled airlines are unlikely to be able to match the fares offered by subsidised surface transport
....
If road and rail had to cover their costs from revenues, as even state-owned
airlines have to, then there would be real competition between transport modes in
Europe." Id. Indeed, Great Britain, France and Germany are presently considering a
proposal to build a railway tunnel beneath the English Channel (a "chunnel") as part
of a high-speed rail network linking the big cities of northwestern Europe. See Europe's Supertrains, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 1987, at 41.
138. The Gap, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Nov. 1985, at 2 (editorial).
139. See Comm'n Press Release, IP (86) 48 (Jan. 30, 1986), 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,762, at 11,750. The Federal Aviation Administration estimates that 400
million Americans will take to the air in 1986, 20 million more than in 1985. Turbulent Times, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 1986, at 28. Airline traffic has grown nearly 55
percent since 1978, when deregulation formally began. Airport Oasis, AIR TRANSPORT
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tion proves that airlines free of regulatory constraints can become highly innovative and competitive, offering lower fares
and improved services for most travelers. 4 '
The argument that free competition would lead to an unsafe air transport system is unconvincing.' 4 ' Fears for safety
could be allayed if EEC Member States maintain a reliable system of government technical supervision and guard against reductions in government expenditures for air traffic and safety
inspections.' 4 2 Anxiety concerning loss of jobs in the
overmanned airline industry following deregulation is balanced by the proposition that increased competition and the
accompanying lower fares would increase passenger traffic and
in turn give rise to new carriers, more flights, and eventually
morejobs.! 43 Memorandum No. 2's mention of safety and employment protection concerns 4 4 indicates that the Commission recognizes that profitability and efficiency are not the only

goals of air transport policy.
The major European airlines are presently in as good a
position economically as they have ever been to meet the challenges of a deregulated system. 14 5 Oligopolies and predatory
Jan. 1987, at 2 (editorial). In Europe, airframe manufacturers, with an eye
to U.S. developments, have become a lobbying force for liberalization in the hopes
that relaxed regulations will bring new sales opportunities. See Liberalized European
WORLD,

Airline Rules Could Increase Airframe Sales, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 14,

1986, at 39.
140. Gordon, GAO Finds DeregulationHas Led to Lower Fares,Improved Service, AVIA-

Dec. 16, 1985, at 33. One study estimates that U.S. deregulation has saved travelers US$6 billion annually. Study Stresses Benefits Achieved
With Deregulation, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 19, 1986, at 44 [hereinafter

TION WEEK & SPACE TECH.,

Study Stresses Benefits].

141. See Salzman, supra note 21, at 409; Stelzer, supra note 129, at 696. The
National Transportation Safety Board cited 1986 as one of the safest years ever for
U.S. airlines. Safety Board Cites 1986 as one of Safest Years Ever, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE

TECH.,Jan. 19, 1987, at 36. However, there remains the danger of struggling airlines
taking short cuts on safety to cut costs. See Garland, supra note 15, at 226-29.
142. See Garland, supra note 15, at 228-29.
143. Id. at 224 (footnote omitted).
144. Memorandum No. 2, supra note 74, 44. It has been estimated that civil
aviation within the Community employs 300,000 people, and approximately 200,000
ancillary workers. BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
145. The 20 large scheduled airlines of the Association of European Airlines
(AEA) projected a US$950 million net profit in 1986, Major European Airlines Expect
$1-Billion Profit in 1986, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. July 7, 1986, at 41, and an-

nual traffic growth rates within Europe are estimated at 5.4 percent for the next five
years. Feazel, World Airline Profits Fall Following Decline in Fares, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., July 14, 1986, at 41.
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pricing are not inevitable in the wake of deregulation. While
the degree of U.S. airline consolidation 4 6 present a frightening prospect to European flag carriers, some of the larger
mergers could have been avoided if the U.S. government had
moved to block the emerging oligarchy.' 4 7 Similar problems
in the EEC could be avoided through "merger control" under
Community law.' 48 The establishment of broad zones of reasonableness for tariffs and a vigilant stance by the Commission
seems the best protection against predatory pricing practices. 149 Moreover, the Commission has noted the importance
of applying rules on subsidies in Articles 92 and 93 of the
Treaty to prevent the distortion of competition by subsidy
wars.' 5 0 Member States could, however, reimburse airlines for
maintaining services to less populated and economically unprofitable areas."'
In practice, deregulation could mean simply treating aviation like other industries. Increased market access and flexibility in pricing and route structure are the key elements to increased efficiency. Within the legal and institutional framework of the EEC's regional grouping of states, the best
elements of U.S.-style deregulation and IATA multilateralism
could be merged. The intra-European market is a mature
transport market where the public utility character of air trans146. Scheduled airlines in the United States have undergone a huge expansion
and subsequent contraction since deregulation began. See Ott, Competition, U.S. Merger
Policy Quicken Consolidation Trend, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.,July 14, 1986, at 33.
From a peak of 229 scheduled carriers in 1984, 132 airlines have since been eliminated by acquistion, merger, liquidation and decertification. Id. A recent consolidation saw the merger of People Express, New York Air and Continental Airlines under
the umbrella of Texas Air Corp.-a holding company which also owns Eastern airlines-to form a combined fleet of nearly 600 large transports. See Preble, People
Express, New York Air Merging Under Continental Umbrella, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., January 19, 1987, at 32.
147. Alfred E. Kahn has stated, "[I]t is very difficult to believe that future administrations will be as negligent as this one about enforcing [the antitrust laws] against
mergers between competitors .
Kahn, The Flying Monopoly Game, Wash. Post,
Aug. 26, 1986, at A17, col. 2.
148. Weber, Air Transport in the Common Market, supra note 51, at 300.
149. See Garland, supra note 15, at 231.
150. See Memorandum No. 2, supra note 74, Annex IV; Comment, Introducing
Competition to the European Economic Community Airline Industry, 15 CAL. W. INT'L LJ.
364, 392-93 (1985).
151. A similar process exists in the U.S., B. GIDWITZ, supra note 11, at 14, and it
appears that service to smaller communities has actually improved since deregulation. See Study Stresses Benefits, supra note 140, at 44.
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port could be retained alongside competition in a system of
"regulated competition." 152
In light of the present difficulties of EEC institutions in
formulating a uniform regulation to be applied to the air transport sector, the Commission should use such powers as it has
to compel liberalization. The Commission should continue
unilateral actions against airlines under Article 89 and begin
procedures against Member States under Article 90 to stimulate an evolutionary process of development, while being careful to avoid conservative backlash against a perceived "heavy
hand."' 53 Moreover, the negotiating of liberal bilateral agreements could provide the foundation for air services based on
free market entry and unrestricted fares. Member States who
support liberalization should seek to gain bilaterally what has
yet to be gained collectively through political action at the
Community level. An appropriate starting point is the elimination of the double approval rule and replacing it with a
"double disapproval" or country of origin rule whereby the
market is geared to the pace of the fastest runner.
These improvisations, though uncoordinated, are but a
step toward reexamining the foundation of the air transport
system, with a view toward systematic improvements. The
Council must take decisive action on the entire package of
Commission proposals as originally submitted, as well as allow
the unrestricted development of regional air services. Under
the Single European Act,154 expected to enter into force sometime in 1987, proposals regarding the common transport policy need no longer be unanimous, but need only pass the
Council by a majority vote.155 An EEC-wide scheme, in order
to prove effective, must liberalize capacity and market entry as
well as tariffs. While Memorandum No. 2 seeks to relax pres152. See P. HAANAPPEL, supra note 15, at 49.

153. A source at the U.K. Department of Transport pointed out that some
Council Ministers disliked being "bullied" by the Commission. EEC Commission Advises Airlines, supra note 72, at 116.

154. Single European Act, E.C. Bull. Supp. 2/86 (1986). The enactment of the
Single European Act has been delayed by private litigation in Ireland challenging the
instrument. See Enactment of Single European Act Delayed When Ireland Fails to Deposit

Instruments of Ratification, 4 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,849, at 11,996 (1987) (CCH
Comment).
155. The Act amends Article 84 of the Treaty to provide for majority voting in
the area of air and sea transport. E.C. Bull. Supp. 2/86, tit. II, § 11(l), art. 16(5).
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ent agreements and arrangements without significantly modifying the underlying system of bilateral agreements and interairline cooperation, it is far better than the measures being implemented by the ECAC, which provide for little more than
cosmetic changes. 1 56 However, the involvement of the ECAC
in any EEC approach is important, since that group is comprised of all the states which might wish to change the scene of
European air tranpsort.
The full application of the competition rules would lead to
a new system of regulations limited to the territory of the EEC.
However, it would also affect states which exercise fifth freedom rights within the Community, that is, the right to undertake commercial transport between third countries. Any deregulated system in Europe must involve the extension of fifth
freedom rights. This could be achieved under a "plurilateral
approach,"' 1 57 which has been touted as a flexible means of
transition towards a liberal framework at the Community level.
This approach involves a combination of bilateral agreements

that completely liberalize traffic between two states. 15 By
combining these agreements, airlines in states party to the
plurilateral agreement would share full fifth freedom rights
with any other two parties to the agreement. 159
In conjunction with a "plurilateral" approach, Member
States could institute a market-by-market approach calling for
liberalism between dynamic markets, such as the United States
and Western Europe, that are characterized by high density
routes and elastic prices. 16 0 Once full fifth freedom rights are
recognized throughout the EEC, Member States could also attempt a reorganization of the airline route system along the
lines of the American "hub-and-spoke" system, whereby airlines route their flights from one part of' the system into an
intermediate "hub" where passengers connect with flights to
156. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
157. Wassenbergh, A New PlurilateralApproach to InternationalAir TransportRegulation, in INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 21, at 209 [hereinafter Wassenbergh, A New PlurilateralApproach]. A draft plurilateral air transport agreement is
then presented. See Veenstra, The 'PlurilateralAir Transport Agreement: A Draft for a
Better Regulatory Instrument, in INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 21, at 215.
158. Wassenbergh, A New PlurilateralApproach, supra note 157, at 209-10.
159. Id. at 209.
160. Ghandour, supra note 21, at 56-57.
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other parts of the system.' 6 ' This results in fewer nonstop
flights but more efficient use of aircraft, higher load factors,
62
and lower costs. 1
CONCLUSION
EEC competition policy in the air transport sector remains
decentralized and ineffective. The legislative vacuum that has
existed since the Community's inception thirty years ago has
permitted the air transport sector to develop unconstrained by
competitive pressures and insulated from the normal consequences of commercial inefficiency. There is an urgent need
for regulations that confer on the Commission the powers of
investigation and sanction necessary to properly apply competition rules to air transport. At present, uncertainty still hovers
over this sector, and the progress of liberalization has been left
unresolved in the wake of Nouvelles Frontie'res. Immediate action
at the Community level must be taken before political momentum to reform the present regulatory regime dissipates.
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161. Garland, supra note 15, at 224.
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